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HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT, by William Patry.  Oxford University 
Press, 2012.  336 pp.  Hardback $21.95. 
Reviewed by Michael J. Madison, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
madison@pitt.edu 
I have long enjoyed reading William Patry’s scholarship on copyright, not 
only because I agree with most of his prescriptions but also, and mostly, 
because his writing relies on a substantive modesty and a stylistic 
readability that makes his arguments inherently appealing.  HOW TO FIX 
COPYRIGHT, his latest book (following on MORAL PANICS AND THE 
COPYRIGHT WARS)1, delivers the goods once again.  Patry assesses the 
entirety of modern copyright, from its foundations to its details, and finds it 
wanting.  His prescription is that policymakers should simply start over, 
taking modern technologies, markets, and uses as their starting points rather 
than continuing to build atop the legacy of 18th century bookselling and 
historical practices of producing cultural commodities. 
For the veteran observer of copyright debates, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 
breaks little new ground but reviews a broad range of issues in an accessible 
and common sense way.  For a reader who is less familiar with the details 
of what some (like Patry) refer to as “the copyright wars,” HOW TO FIX 
COPYRIGHT is a helpful overview of the relevant landscape, accompanied 
by some gentle and some sharp proposals for reform. Regardless of 
background, one would be hard-pressed to find a better contemporary 
synthesis of what ails copyright today.  Given the breadth of Patry’s 
experience in copyright―as a staff member in the House of 
Representatives, as a scholar, and now as copyright counselor to 
Google―that comes as no surprise.   
What is something of a surprise, coming from someone with Patry’s 
reputation as a careful, ground-it-in-logic-not-ideology student of the 
discipline, is the strength of his current convictions.  Copyright is not just 
broken but is broken very badly, in his judgment, and it is failing the very 
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people―authors and readers―that it was originally intended, according to 
the mythos of the law, to serve. 
That said, I have a few quibbles with the book and one larger bone to pick.  
But first, a summary. 
HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT might have been better titled “What About 
Copyright Needs to be Fixed?”, because rather more of the book is given 
over to what is wrong with today’s copyright and rather less of it is devoted 
to prescriptions and solutions.  But that would have deprived the author of 
the pun-ish title, and of the following deeper point.  Technology and society 
are fast-moving substrates for any law that deals in creativity and culture.  
The challenge in “fixing” copyright is not merely to lay claim to the law’s 
concern with original works of authorship that are “fixed” in a tangible 
medium of expression, but also to identify the point where the law itself, as 
a stable institution, can safely and justly engage with the dynamic people 
and institutions that it touches. 
What about copyright needs to be fixed, at least in that first sense?  The 
answer, in a nutshell, is almost everything.  In Patry’s telling, today’s 
copyright law and legislation is dominated by greedy, rent-seeking 
corporate copyright interests that invoke property rhetoric excessively and 
deprive the public―both first-generation and second-comer authors, 
readers, viewers, listeners, and users―of the full benefits available under a 
dynamic intellectual property regime.  Historical copyright has been undone 
by modern changes to technology and markets.  Restoring a healthy 
alignment between law and society means giving fuller weight in 
lawmaking to demand-based and consumer-based priorities.  The question 
for copyright law is not “what do authors deserve?” so much as it is “what 
do consumers want?”  And doing that effectively and fairly means restoring 
lawmaking processes that are based on the empirics of creativity, 
innovation, and commercialization, rather than on ideology and rhetoric. 
The full argument can be summarized, then, in a handful of quotations: 
 Laws must be consistent with prevailing markets and 
technologies because technologies play a large (though not 
exclusive) role in creating consumer demand; markets then 
satisfy that demand.  Without consumer demand for your 
book or musical work, owning a copyright is meaningless. 
(p.2) 
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 I call for a moratorium on the introduction and passage of 
any new legislation until (1) we have established 
independent, rigorous, economically verifiable 
methodologies by which all proposals will be tested and later 
reviewed for their effectiveness, and (2) we have tested all 
existing laws by those methodologies and have repealed or 
suitably amended those that fail the review.  (pp.5-6) 
 
 My view is that copyright laws can serve valuable purposes: 
while they do not cause people to create in the first place and 
do not create economic or critical success, they do ensure 
that once works are created, those who wish to protect them 
and economically benefit can. (p.11) 
There is much more to the book, of course, but through Patry’s entire text – 
covering copyright fundamentals (the concept of the copy should be 
revisited); copyright-based business models (current copyright serves the 
large-scale “winner take all” models of commercial creativity, not authors 
and other creators themselves); licensing and clearance complexities (Patry 
bemoans the absence of a worldwide system for simplifying clearance of 
rights in musical works); copyright enforcement (overbroad and punitive 
remedies foster disrespect for the law and undermine its legitimacy); and 
some specifics of doctrine (the unnecessary extension of property interests 
in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act; the overly-long length of the 
copyright term; the virtues of some copyright formalities; and a reprise of 
Patry’s “moral panic” argument about the proper uses of fair use)―a 
handful of common themes repeat:  Copyright should be sensitive to market 
and technological context.  Markets and technological contexts keep 
changing.  Changing the law (or failing to change the law) without carefully 
considering the impact of the law runs the risk of disabling actual human 
beings, on a wide scale, from making beneficial use of―even profiting 
from―creative work.  At almost every step, Patry illustrates his claims with 
data―not only data from today’s creative economy, but historical accounts.  
Unlike much cultural criticism of the excesses of contemporary copyright, 
this criticism is situated in the full range of modern copyright history rather 
than only in an account of the last 20 years.  The virtue of the book lies 
more in the synthesis of these things in a single, breezy volume and less in 
their specifics.   
Veteran observers (including me) will recognize many of the critiques and 
proposals from academic and other policy criticism of the last decade.  At 
the margins, the book may be faulted for focusing too much on conflicts 
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between business interests and individual interests as expressed (on both 
sides) in legal terms, and not enough on other fora and frameworks:  
government institutions, both in the US and especially outside the US, that 
are devoted to cultural flourishing; and systems of informal interests 
collected as social norms, histories, formal institutions and informal 
practices that play important roles in both the production and distribution of 
creative works.  The book takes a modestly critical attitude with respect to 
the foundational concept of the copy in copyright but does not dive more 
deeply into the phenomenal basis for the law.  Why, it might be said, must 
copyright attach itself to the work of authorship?  If Patry is really serious 
about stripping copyright to its core and building from first principles, 
taking evidence as a guide, then let’s really start at the beginning.  What do 
creators create, and what do consumers consume?  Readers read?  Viewers 
watch?  And so on.  But Patry is a pragmatist, not a theoretician.  He 
engages where the argument is already well underway, and wisely, he does 
so where he thinks he can have impact. 
Those are my quibbles.  It almost goes without saying that a reviewer 
situated differently, say, grounded in Lockean philosophy or Coasean 
economics, or attached concretely to the benefits thought to be associated 
with existing cultural institutions (commercial publishers, film producers, 
record labels, and the like) might quibble differently and more aggressively.  
Patry’s “readers first” approach conflicts directly with the “authors first” 
philosophy and economy that informs the other side of the copyright 
debates that he identifies. 
But I promised a bit more.  I have a bigger concern. 
Patry makes no bones about his distaste for “corporate” creativity and for 
the arcane business architectures of the contemporary copyright community.  
He writes:   
Our copyright laws are, and have always been, a winner-
take-all system.  If that is the desired policy, then our 
copyright laws are working fine.  If, however, the policy is to 
create diverse works by diverse members of our society in 
order to create a rich cultural heritage, then it is important to 
realize copyright laws have never accomplished that 
purpose.  Indeed, our copyright laws on steroids are 
impeding creativity. (p.80) 
Yet HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT offers “the market” as the ultimate arbiter 
of consumer (reader) interests in copyright.  Patry again:   
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Many businesses that rely on copyrighted material have a 
problem: not enough consumers are paying for their works.  
While copyright owners like to portray this as a legal 
problem―a problem of piracy―the problem is a market 
problem, arising from the continuing failure of copyright 
owners to respond and adapt to changing markets and the 
technologies that drive consumer demand.  (p.141) 
Note the framing here.  Markets drive demand.  Technologies drive 
markets.  As technologies change, markets change, and demand changes.  
Copyright owners need to adapt and respond to demand.  Here and 
elsewhere, Patry builds on the work done in the UK via a report., 
commissioned by the British Government and published in the United 
Kingdom in 2011.2 
Patry does not pause to consider the possibility that the abstraction he calls 
“markets” might plausibly and logically lead to the winner-take-all results 
that he decries.  Markets today might be working just fine; consumers might 
simply prefer to spend their time and money on Hollywood blockbusters 
and sound-alike pop songs.  Or markets might not work well at all; 
consumers might prefer documentaries and independent films and quirky 
folk/bluegrass blends.  Patry’s money seems to be on the latter, but how 
might we ever know what consumers―who on the latter account really 
ought to be called readers, listeners, and viewers, as a well as authors in 
their own rights―really want? 
As I wandered through Patry’s argument, I recalled the work of another 
veteran copyright observer who commented, perhaps more optimistically, 
on how copyright and copyright owners should respond to changes in 
technology.  In 1994, Paul Goldstein published COPYRIGHT’S 
HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM 
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX,3 a prescient book that 
considered the copyright system in comprehensive terms, bearing in mind 
history and emerging changes in technology.  Goldstein came to the 
judgment―like Patry―that copyright and copyright owners needed to be 
attuned to the new landscape.  And the best way to do that was to let the 
market mediate consumer demand.  This was the only way, Goldstein 
concluded, and the best way, to figure out what was and is best for society: 
The digital future is the next, and perhaps ultimate, phase in 
copyright’s long trajectory, perfecting the law’s early aim of 
connecting authors to their audiences, free from interference 
by political sovereigns or the will of patrons.  The main 
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challenge will be to keep this trajectory clear of the buffets 
of protectionism and true to copyright’s historic logic that 
the best prescription for connecting authors to their 
audiences is to extend rights into every corner where 
consumers derive value from literary and artistic works.  If 
history is any measure, the result should be to promote 
political as well as cultural diversity, ensuring a plenitude of 
voices, all with the chance to be heard.4 
Goldstein came across as an optimist about copyright’s future; Patry comes 
across as a pessimist.  Yet they each look to technology and to markets for 
sources and solutions.  How can Patry and Goldstein come to such different 
judgments?  Can they both be right?  
One answer is that they are both wrong.  “The market” is a monist 
metaphor, and a kind of black box, that conceals the plural ways in which 
creative work is created and enjoyed, and the ways in which many 
individuals are precluded from participating in “markets” as they wish to.  
Julie Cohen dives deeply into just this critique in her recent book, 
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE 
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE.5 
As a second answer, and the one that I prefer, I am inclined to give Patry 
(and Goldstein, too) the benefit of the doubt.  I think that when William 
Patry argues that copyright lawmakers should listen to the market, the 
metaphor he invokes is not the metaphor that Paul Goldstein invoked―even 
though the phrase itself is, of course, identical. 
Goldstein was laying out the Coasean argument for the design of 
transaction-centered copyright economics.  If we take seriously copyright’s 
prescription of aesthetic nondiscrimination and extend the judicial humility 
at its core by one more step―to a position of full epistemic humility―then 
there is no reason to suppose that policymakers know the shape of society’s 
cultural welfare curve better than consumers themselves do.  The only 
practical and possibly objective way to measure welfare under that curve is 
by price―that is, by consumer’s willingness to pay.  Market transactions 
measure utility; thus the aim of copyright policy should be to maximize the 
number and value of market transactions.  If Britney Spears becomes rich 
and famous in part because copyright protects her record label’s prices, then 
who are we to complain that Lucinda Williams has not gotten the hearing 
she deserves in the cultural marketplace?   
Patry’s market, while far from fully detailed, is a different thing, with a 
different aim.  Patry’s market, it seems to me, is not only or even primarily 
the market that results from made transactions in cultural works; it is not the 
market that follows, as Goldstein’s does, from the specification of legal 
rights in copyright.  Instead, Patry’s market is the set of consumer (reader, 
etc.) choices that are made available and specified prior to policy decisions 
regarding the design of exclusive rights.  Goldstein’s transacting authors 
and consumers are free to choose rationally from the goods and services 
they produce and encounter; Patry’s authors and consumers are differently 
enabled and disabled from choosing, based on the phenomena of digital 
networked technology.  As a starting point, but not as an end point, in 
Patry’s market creative works exist in their ideal sense in endlessly 
replicable digital abundance, rather than only in depletable analog copies.  
In that market specified by digital abundance, does copyright need to be 
fixed?  In the casual “does it need to be repaired?” sense, William Patry is 
clearly correct:  It does, and he makes a persuasive case regarding the 
reasons.  In the more subtle “can copyright be made effective as a static 
body of law?” sense, I am not sold, much as I liked this book.  The 
technological specifications of Patry’s market are changing day by day, and 
perhaps too swiftly for any body of law fully, and adequately, to deal with 
them.  But may answering that challenge fully be part of Patry’s next 
offering. 
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HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT, by William Patry.  Oxford University 
Press, 2012.  336 pp.  Hardback $21.95. 
Reviewed by Alfred C. Yen, Boston College Law School. 
alfred.yen@bc.edu 
 
In HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT, William Patry offers his thoughts about 
the problems that beset copyright.  Patry, like many others1 believes that 
copyright does not serve its stated purpose of incentivizing the creation and 
dissemination of new creative works.2  Instead, copyright enriches those 
who own copyright rights while inhibiting creativity and restricting access 
to creative works.  Patry lays blame for this on a number of corporate-
sponsored fallacies about copyright that support overly broad copyright 
rights.  He uses this book to discuss these fallacies, how they affect the 
present shape of copyright, and his ideas for improving copyright. 
Patry is one of America’s most accomplished copyright lawyers and the 
author of an important treatise.3  Accordingly, any book written by Patry is 
presumptively worth attention as an opportunity to learn from his vast 
experience in the field.  Not surprisingly, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 
showcases Patry’s knowledge.  He easily moves through basic copyright, 
multiple industries, technology, history, and international problems.  The 
result is an engaging, accessible description of what ails copyright and how 
Patry thinks it might be fixed. 
HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT describes two separate, but related, problems.  
First, Patry claims that modern copyright is far stronger than necessary to 
serve the public interest.  Second, Patry lays the blame for this on 
corporations and executives who profit by acquiring and exploiting huge 
numbers of copyrighted works in one-sided deals that generally siphon 
revenue away from creative authors.  These wealthy actors understand that 
their profits depend on the value of the copyrights they hold, so they and 
their legislative allies have concocted a myth to justify the progressive 
strengthening of copyright (p.13).  This myth holds that copyright “causes 
amazing things to happen for the benefit of everyone, and with no conflicts 
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or tradeoffs” (p.13).  Unfortunately, “villains” like file sharers and Internet 
companies threaten to disrupt the quasi-utopia supported by copyright, so 
society needs stronger copyright rights to fight these villains (pp.13-14). 
Patry spends a good deal of the book attacking this myth.  He observes that 
copyright doesn’t make a person creative (pp.15-16).  Copyright may create 
economic opportunities for copyright holders by stopping others from free 
riding, but creative talent and initiative – not copyright – make a work 
successful in the first place (p.16).  Indeed, Patry contends, the economic 
opportunities created by copyright actually encourage the corporations who 
hold most valuable copyrights to shy away from creative efforts in favor of 
bland works that recycle popular themes in banal ways (pp.20-26).  Patry 
suggests, with some justification, that true support for creativity and culture 
might better come from more direct subsidies such as government grants, 
tax breaks, and the development of infrastructure that supports authors 
trying to reach audiences (pp.17, 26-29). 
Next, Patry attacks the claim that copyright boosts economic productivity 
and competitiveness (pp.32-33).  Patry argues that copyright does no such 
thing.  As evidence, he cites the European Union’s database directive, 
which strengthened protection for databases (pp.33-34, 71-74).  Although 
the directive was passed to strengthen the European database industry, 
American database manufacturers outperform their European counterparts 
without the benefit of specific database protection.4  Patry goes on to argue 
that copyright does not improve competitiveness.  Indeed, he claims it 
harms competition because copyright gets concentrated in the hands of 
large corporate actors who push for stronger copyright protection as a way 
to prevent competition (pp.34-35). 
Finally, Patry attacks the assertion that copyright is necessary for the 
flourishing of copyright-based business.  Here, Patry notes that traditional 
copyright-based industries have generally adopted business models that 
exploit copyright-supported artificial scarcity.  He notes, however, that the 
world has fundamentally changed because digital technology enables the 
reproduction and distribution of works at no cost (pp.35-41).  Such a world 
is fundamentally incompatible with business models based on scarcity 
because artificial scarcity will become impossible to maintain.  Copyright 
therefore encourages copyright-based industries to cling stubbornly to old 
business models (such as selling compact discs full of music) that are 
doomed to fail as consumers migrate to digital forms of distribution.  Patry 
argues that copyright-based businesses would benefit from recognizing the 
impact of digital technology and adopting business models that exploit, 
instead of resist, the benefits digital technology will bring (pp.42-47). 
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Having debunked the myth responsible for the present shape of copyright, 
Patry argues that society should replace blind faith in myth with a rational 
approach to copyright based on “empirically sound evidence” (p.90).  
According to Patry, this approach to copyright should lead courts and 
Congress to weaken copyright significantly because copying, not 
copyright’s restriction of copying, promotes creativity.  “If we genuinely 
want to encourage creativity, we must encourage copying” (p.90).  And 
indeed, over the next few chapters Patry offers a number of general 
proposals for how this might be done.  These include shortening the 
duration of copyright (pp.189-201), imposing formalities to maintain 
copyrights (pp.203-209) taking a more generous approach towards fair use 
(pp.211-229), and more effective use of payment methods like compulsory 
licensing, levies on recording materials, and collective licensing (pp.177-
188). 
On the whole, I agree with Patry’s assertion that copyright is much stronger 
than it needs to be for society’s overall benefit.  Recent extension of 
copyright’s duration surely does little to encourage new creation,5 courts 
have adopted readings of fair use that interfere with the creation of new 
works,6 and enactments like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act make it 
very easy for copyright holders to run roughshod over the rights of non-
infringers who are not familiar with its complicated procedures and 
substantive copyright law. 7   Society would probably be well served by 
adopting many of Patry’s recommendations. 
I also agree that large corporate actors have played a significant role in 
promoting stronger copyright through rhetoric that incorporates the myth 
Patry identifies.  However, I am unsure if corporate ownership of copyright 
is as troubling as Patry claims.  Moreover, even if one concludes that 
concentrated ownership of copyright is undesirable, I do not think that 
Patry’s suggested reforms will bring about the necessary change because 
social forces beyond copyright are probably responsible for the 
concentrated control he criticizes. 
Patry objects to heavy corporate ownership of copyrights because he 
considers it a form of trickle-down economics that enriches corporations 
and their executives while keeping money from creative individuals to 
whom money should flow.  Patry gives us statistics to show that four record 
labels control about 85% of the U.S. market for recorded music and that 5 
motion picture studios control 80% of the U.S. motion picture market 
(pp.111-112).  He also notes that in 2010, Viacom’s CEO made $84.5 
million, and that top executives at Warner Brothers made $83.9 million 
while the company was losing money (pp.112-113).  For Patry, this 
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concentration of wealth presents a “crisis in copyright policy” (p.113) 
because trickle-down economics does not work.  Passing copyright laws 
that enrich corporations and corporate executives is the same thing as 
cutting taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals.   It isn’t wise policy 
for the general economy, so it can’t possibly be good copyright policy either 
(pp.109-113). 
For those who share Patry’s general skepticism about trickle-down 
economics, this argument may be persuasive.  However, there are plenty of 
reputable economists (not to mention members of the public) who have 
confidence in the general notion that helping the wealthy and large 
corporations inures to the benefit of society at large because their spending 
and investment create opportunities for others.8  It is easy to imagine how 
these economists would conclude that Patry does not have “empirically 
sound evidence” to back up his claims about copyright.  Indeed, they might 
dismiss Patry’s argument as ideological rhetoric of the sort used to unfairly 
impugn conservative economic policies.  They might well argue that 
corporate ownership of copyright exists because it is the most economically 
efficient way to market and distribute works to the general public.  After all, 
most authors do not have access to printing presses, marketing experts, and 
distribution networks.  Corporations provide these essential facilities and 
services at a fee that reflects bargains freely made. 
Even if one accepts Patry’s argument against the concentrated business 
ownership of copyright rights, it is not clear that his proffered solutions 
would decrease concentrated ownership or funnel revenue towards creative 
authors.  Consider what would happen if Congress significantly reduced the 
duration of copyright.  This would obviously reduce the power of 
corporately held copyright by more quickly dedicating works to free public 
use.  It would not, however, decrease the corporate ownership of works still 
protected by copyright.  The economic forces that cause authors to sign 
rights away to corporations will not disappear simply because Congress 
shortened copyright’s duration.  Authors who believe it is in their best 
interests to sign book contracts with corporate publishers will still do so.  
Corporations will therefore still reap the lion’s share of copyright benefits, 
but for a shorter period of time. 
A similar conclusion applies if, as Patry suggests, Congress required 
copyright holders to comply with new formalities as a condition of getting 
or maintaining copyright.  Perhaps copyrights would expire unless 
copyright holders formally renewed them every 25 years, or perhaps failure 
to place notice on a copyrighted work would preclude the copyright holder 
from enforcing its rights.  While such measures would probably result in 
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some (mostly unprofitable) works reaching the public domain quickly, it’s 
not likely that corporations will abandon profitable works very often.  True, 
Congress could increase the abandonment rate by making it more costly and 
complicated to comply with formalities, but this could have the unintended 
effect of causing individual authors, and not corporations, to lose copyrights 
– a result the public might find unattractive. 
HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT is an enjoyable book written by an astute 
observer of its subject.  However, it only partially addresses the problems 
that it identifies.  Our copyright law is too strong, and Patry gives us some 
sensible ways to improve (if not completely fix) that problem.  Our 
copyright law also makes it possible for corporations who own copyrights 
to earn significant profits at the expense of creative authors, and it 
incentivizes those corporations to push for copyright laws that don’t serve 
the public interest.  Unfortunately, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT does not 
tell us how to fix that problem, and perhaps it cannot. 
Copyright works by giving authors the chance to profit from exploiting their 
works.  Because authors are not experts in marketing and distributing their 
works, they generally must deal with commercial distributors to realize 
copyright’s economic promises.  Those businesses bargain hard to take 
what Patry thinks are an inappropriate percentage of the profits that are 
ultimately raised.  This is a poignant observation that raises an 
understandable impulse to better compensate those who engage in the 
authorial labors that society admires. 
Additional reflection suggests, however, that a real solution to this would 
have been impossible for Patry.  The world is full of individuals like 
teachers and firefighters who arguably don’t get paid what they deserve, and 
there are plenty of individuals and entities who probably make more than 
they “should”.  Society may be tempted to “fix” this problem through law, 
but it generally refrains from doing so because it would be unwise to try to 
figure out exactly what every deserving or undeserving person should really 
make.  If this is true, then HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT demonstrates how 
copyright simply reflects tensions that run throughout our society.  Once 
economic rights are created, markets will emerge to allocate those rights, 
and society may not always be pleased with the result.  Whether and how to 
“fix” those problems is one of the most vexing questions our society 
confronts today.  If we ever figure out the answer to that question, perhaps 
then we will be ready to truly “fix” copyright. 
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HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT, by William Patry.  Oxford University 
Press, 2012.  336 pp.  Hardback $21.95. 
Author’s Response by William Patry, Google, Inc.  
williampatry@yahoo.com 
Thanks to Professor Gallagher for the idea of this discussion, and for 
making it happen.  Thanks, of course, to Mike Madison and Fred Yen for 
taking the time to read my book and write up a review.  Theirs is, in some 
ways, a thankless task:  if a reviewer is effusive in his or her praise, the 
author will be pleased, but you run the risk of alienating readers of your 
review who may dismiss it as puffery.  On the other hand, if you are quite 
critical of the book, you can be sure the author will be upset, while readers 
of the review are likely to be divided by their own preconceptions of the 
author and the reviewer.  Reviewing a book is tough work. 
Reading reviews of your book is also tough.  I have come to dread reviews 
of books I write.  I dread reviews because they are rarely about the book, 
but are too often a mere platform for the reviewer to show how much 
smarter, how much more knowledgeable he or she allegedly is than the 
author of the book.  This thinly disguised form of self-promotion usually 
takes the form of a lengthy discourse on what the reviewer would have 
written, or the reviewer’s perspective on the subject.  The author of the 
book being reviewed always falls short, and so even if there is praise, it is 
faint and misplaced.  I had one such recent reviewer tell me I should be 
pleased that the review was being placed in such a prestigious law review.  I 
wasn’t pleased, since I was simply the foil to illuminate the reviewer’s self-
perceived brilliance. 
Other reviewers have a baffling hatred for my employer, and falsely treat 
HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT as corporate propaganda.  As I note in the 
foreword, I could never get any of my colleagues to look at drafts of the 
book.  A well-oiled propaganda machine should at least have some role in 
generating its own propaganda, but despite writing two books since joining 
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Google, I have not managed to ever get a Google employee to look at a 
draft single page of either book, despite many, many efforts.  Moreover, I 
have been writing books on copyright since 1985, when my fair use treatise 
was first published.  I didn’t join Google until October 2006, 21 years later.  
Among other works I have written since the fair use treatise, is a 7,000-page 
treatise, all before I joined Google, creating a pretty big record to have to 
swallow if I had decided to become a corporate shill.  Those who regard my 
books as corporate propaganda have never delved into such fine points, or 
sought to even examine my much larger opus.  As my mother used to say to 
me when losing an argument, “Don’t confuse me with the facts.” 
What I hope for in a book review―whether of my book or of someone 
else’s—is an effort to understand what the author sought to accomplish, and 
then an analysis of how well the author did so.  By this standard, Mike’s 
and Fred’s are exemplary reviews.  I am grateful to them.  They set out to 
dissect what they think I was saying, and then describe their areas of 
agreement or disagreement.  Since language is imprecise, there can be 
differences of opinion about an author’s intent, purpose, and meaning.  
This response is intended to clear up a few aspects of the reviews where my 
intentions, purposes, and text diverge from Mike and Fred’s assessments.  
The bottom line is this:  I think the areas of disagreement are attributable 
not to different views, but to misunderstandings.  I leave it to others to 
decide whether those misunderstandings are the result of things I said in the 
text, or to Mike and Fred’s interpretation of my text.  After all, as authors of 
their reviews, Mike and Fred are now subject to the same interpretative 
problems with their reviews as I have with my book. 
Background 
Even though I am a child of the 1960s and grew up across the Golden Gate 
Bridge in Marin County, I am not a radical or an ideologue.  Indeed, my 
experiences during that wonderful era have made me skeptical of radicals 
and ideologues.  I was very pleased that Mike said I have a reputation as “a 
careful, ground-it-in-logic-not ideology student of the discipline.”  The 
older I get, the more it seems to me that radicals and ideologues (and many 
are both) ignore the complexities of life, overlook the ambiguity of 
experiences, confuse correlation with causation, and forget that most of us 
just want to enjoy life, our family, and our friends.  We are not out to 
remake the world so much as to find our place in it.  We are pragmatic, and 
not theoreticians.  I have no interest in ideology or theory, both of which 
remind me of the criticism of a current French politician about the U.S. 
economy:  “Yes, it works in practice, but how does it work in theory?” 
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Yippie founder and political activist Abbe Hoffman (author of the 
appropriately named work “Steal This Book”) found out that ideologues are 
generally held in low regard, especially by people just trying to enjoy 
themselves.  Appearing at Woodstock in 1969, he rushed the stage during a 
performance by The Who.  He was protesting the jailing of White Panther 
John Sinclair, but was chased off the stage by Peter Townsend, who is 
reported to have hit him (accidentally or not), on the back with his guitar, 
causing Hoffman to topple off the stage and into the pit.  His fall was 
cheered by concert-goers. 
We all want to improve things, to make our lives and those of our family 
and friends better, but we don’t want to destroy things in the process.  John 
Lennon made this point the year before Woodstock, in his lyrics for the 
song “Revolution”: 
You say you want a revolution 
Well, you know 
We all want to change the world 
You tell me that it’s evolution 
Well, you know 
We all want to change the world 
But when you talk about destruction 
Don’t you know that you can count me out. 
That’s my view of copyright law too.  I look at copyright law as a 
traditionalist, as someone who has practiced it for 30 years; as someone 
who spent 12 years in private practice representing copyright owners; and 
spent 7 years on Capitol Hill with the Copyright Office (hardly an anti-
copyright institution) and the House of Representatives Committee on the 
Judiciary (ditto).  I feel blessed to have spent my professional career in such 
a wonderful field of law.  My disappointments with the current state of law, 
while real, are within-the-family disappointments, much like the 
disappointment with a favorite uncle who has a mid-life crisis and does 
really stupid things.  You still love him, but you want him to get grounded 
again.  That’s my wish for copyright law: to be grounded in evidence and 
crafted so that it can effective accomplish realistic goals.  That’s why the 
book is called HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT and not “Why We Need to 
Abolish Copyright.” 1 
Mike is accurate in saying that I believe our current system is badly broken 
and that it is failing authors and readers.  At the same time, Mike overstates 
my views when he says that I believe almost everything needs to be fixed in 
our current copyright laws.  Many parts, especially the core principles of 
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judge-made law (e.g., who is an author, what is an original work, what is 
infringement, fair use) are working fine and have for over two hundred 
years.  The problems―and they are big ones—are both relatively recent and 
political:  (1) the misuse of copyright law to solve business problems; (2) 
the misuse of copyright law to thwart innovation; (3) the misuse of 
copyright law as a tool of international trade policy by a few, large 
countries; and (4) the over-promising of copyright as the essential element 
in competition and cultural policymaking.  Since laws are tools and not ends 
in themselves, the problems as I see them stem not from any inherent nature 
of copyright law, but rather from law’s misuse.  
Things weren’t always this way.  The 1909 Copyright Act, while having 
some problems like all human efforts, was a perfectly fine copyright act.  
While I would be happier if we started from scratch in light of a changed 
digital environment, or happy if we at least thought things through from 
scratch, I would also be happy if we repealed our current laws and simply 
went back to the 1909 Copyright Act.  Why?  Unlike the 1976 Act, the 1909 
Act was not ideological.  It was pragmatic:  how do we protect authors’ 
(including corporate authors’) investment and get more works to market?  
The use of a copyright notice, a renewal requirement, and a generous but 
not overly long term of protection, took care of most of our current 
difficulties.  There were no analog much less digital locks.  Copyright was 
not being misused as a way to control the features on consumer products 
(although that quickly changed after passage of the 1976 Act as reflected in 
the Sony Betamax case).  Fair use lived purely as a common law creature.  
The sum of the 1909 Act was that the term of protection closely 
approximated commercial needs, fair use enabled subsequent authors to 
build on the works of their predecessors, and there were no orphan works. 
I regard the 1909 Act as effective.  I don’t regard it, and no one at the time 
regarded it, as weak.  It was based on empirically sound evidence of how 
long copyright needed to be (based on renewal records).  Fred asserts I 
believe, as he puts it, that “a rational approach to copyright based on 
empirically sound evidence … should lead courts and Congress to weaken 
copyright significantly … .”  This is not an accurate description of my 
views.  I do not believe that an evidence-based approach to copyright would 
weaken copyright protection.  “Weaken” is used metaphorically here by 
Fred, and I think inappropriately so.  We think of weak as bad and strong as 
good, so weakening copyright protection is certainly bad.  The one thing I 
do think of as bad is ineffective laws.  Laws are ineffective when they are 
not fit for their purpose.  
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What is the purpose of copyright laws?  Here is where the ideologues seize 
an opening to push aside an evidence-based approach.  If the purpose of 
copyright law is to “secure” property rights, then the sky is the limit to its 
strength in a Blackstonian world.  If the purpose is, as our current Register 
of Copyright has argued, “for authors first and the Nation second,” then fair 
use and other principles that help subsequent authors and the public must be 
narrowly construed if not vigorously fought.  If your purpose is to 
encourage the creation of new works, we need to figure out why people 
create, the different types of creativity that exist, and what type of 
incentives we need. I spend a great deal of time in the book on these 
questions, a discussion that is not discussed in the reviews.  See Chapters 1 
through 3.  It is important to figure this out, if as is routinely claimed, 
copyright laws are necessary to further creativity.  Copyright laws, in my 
opinion, suffer from over-promising.  They are said to do many things they 
can’t, and for those things they can do, we don’t spend the time to make 
sure they do them well.  This is a criticism of the process, not of any 
inherent feature of copyright. 
Fred notes my belief that our current copyright laws are far stronger than 
are necessary to serve the public interest (I am careful to note that in my 
view the public interest includes authors), but he then adds that I blame 
“companies and executives who profit by acquiring and exploiting large 
numbers of copyrighted works in one-sided deals that generally siphon 
revenue away from creative authors.”  He later comments that I object to 
“heavy corporate ownership of copyrights because [I] consider[] it a form of 
trickle-down economics that enriches corporations and their executives 
while keeping money from creative individuals to whom the money should 
flow.”  This does indeed make me sound like a 1960s Marin County radical. 
But I’m not.  My alleged anti-corporate bias is particularly ironic given that 
I work in-house for one of our leading corporations (Google).  I believe that 
Google collectively and its employees individually are quite creative.  The 
same can be said for many other corporations, including those in the motion 
picture industry.  Corporations are not my Moby Dick or even my foil.  (I 
don’t believe they are “people” within the meaning of the First Amendment 
though). 
Inequality in bargaining leverage between creators and distributors/patrons 
has been an economic fact of life for centuries. Joseph Haydn was a servant 
and didn’t own rights in works he created for his patron, as was true for all 
other composers of the time.  In England, passage of the Statute of Anne 
didn’t improve the lot of authors over the prior Stationers Guild regime, 
even as authors were put forth Cyrano de Bergerac-like as the reason for the 
statute. I am hardly the first to note this. In 1774, Edmund Thurlow, then 
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Attorney General of England, argued before the House of Lords that 
booksellers had introduced authors into the copyright equation “to give a 
colourable Face to their Monopoly.”  I detail other comments on pages 107-
108. 
I fully recognize this inequality is not the result of copyright laws, but of the 
market place.  The problem for copyright policy is that authors are put 
forward as the prime beneficiary or at least a principal of the system.  (If 
you are the Register of Copyright, authors are prime.)  They’re not in 
practice though.  How can a law be effective under such circumstances?  
We could be honest and say our copyright laws have always been designed 
to benefit those who trade in copyrighted works.  If we did that, then our 
copyright laws are effective for that purpose.  But we are given the false 
trickle-down argument:  if we give authors the ability to make others rich 
off their works, some of the money will trickle back down to authors.  Fred 
objects to this argument, both for copyright law and for the economy 
generally.  But his objection equates ideological fervor with facts.  I don’t 
care about ideology, only facts.  Our nation has a greatly diminished middle 
class, a growing poor class, and a huge concentration of wealth by the top 
0.01 percent of families.  This isn’t ideology, it’s a fact, as I set out on 
pages 107-113.  
It is also a fact of our copyright distribution system, as fewer and fewer 
companies own more and more.  Contrary to Fred’s assertion, I don’t object 
to corporate ownership of copyrights.  What I object to is the claim that 
increasing the term of copyright and increasing penalties, along with digital 
locks, benefits everyone.  It doesn’t.  It benefits the few at the expense of 
the many. I am fine with companies being successful.  I want media 
companies to be successful.  I am a big consumer of their products.  I don’t 
mind them buying copyrights from authors cheap and selling them dear.  
But let’s be clear about whom our laws will benefit.  They have never 
benefitted primarily individuals.  If we want our copyright laws to benefit 
individuals then we need to make a number of important revisions, many of 
which I detail in the book. 
Mike also misapprehends the role I believe copyright law should play.  He 
states my view as asking not “what do authors deserve?” but rather “what 
do consumers want?”  Mike believes I want lawmakers to give “fuller 
weight” to “demand-based and consumer-based priorities.”  I don’t. I want 
copyright laws to stay out of the way, to not thwart consumer demand.  
What do consumers want is not a question copyright laws should try to 
answer.  That’s a business, not a legal answer.  It becomes a legal problem 
only when laws are enacted that give copyright owners the ability to thwart 
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consumer demand, e.g., for unlocked phones, for making back-up copies, or 
for geo-neutral access.  The two most important points I tried to make in the 
book are (1) law is not a solution for business problems, (2) many of 
copyright owners’ currents problems are business problems, not legal 
problems.  They should, therefore, solve them as business people.  See 
chapter 5.  The transformation of copyright law from regulating what 
people do with copyright works into a tool for allowing copyright owners to 
control consumer product/services features, as well as access to works, is 
profound and profoundly troubling.  
What should be the relationship between markets and copyright laws?  
Mike first notes my description of copyright laws as having always 
functioned in support of a winner-takes-all system, but adds that I have 
(allegedly) not considered “the possibility that the abstraction he calls 
‘markets’ might plausibly and logically lead to the winner-takes-all results 
that he decries.”  I not only accept that possibility, but I declare it:  “the 
marketplace is fine for works by corporations and by the authors they 
support―but it does mean we need to find non-market ways for other 
authors and artists to obtain the necessary initial conditions to create” 
(p.17).  The problem I write about is that copyright laws are claimed to be 
able to overcome market forces and to create diverse offerings by such 
works.  Governments have been very vocal in supporting copyright-on-
steroids as cost-free a way to increase cultural offerings, when this is 
impossible.  If, as a matter of cultural policy, we want more bluegrass, 
klezmer and the like, then neither relying on the market or copyright laws is 
going to do it; we need other forms of support.  That’s my point. 
I am therefore grateful that Mike accurately characterizes my view of 
markets as “the set of consumer (reader, etc.) choices that are made 
available and specified prior to policy decisions regarding the design of 
exclusive rights.”  I go further and argue that copyright by itself does not 
create value.  Only the market creates value.  Laws can protect that value, 
but they can’t create it.  The problem in calls for stronger and stronger 
copyright laws is that they are often based on the argument that doing so 
will create more value.  I don’t see how this is true:  If you have a movie 
that no one wants to see, the strength of your copyright is irrelevant.  And if 
the world wants to see Justin Bieber and not a klezmer clarinetist, that is the 
market at work.  But please don’t give Justin Bieber (or more accurately 
whatever company owns his rights) a huge grant of rights because it is 
either (a) necessary to create value or (b) will help klezmer musicians. 
A final point.  My call for effective laws is not a call for effective static 
laws. See, for example, pages 233-237 (“Innovation Requires a Dynamic 
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Legal System”).  I argue that markets and the technologies that drive 
demand in them are dynamic and that the laws regulating them must be 
dynamic too.  That will require creativity too. 
ENDNOTES 
1 Mike claimed the title has a pun in it, using the word “fix,” but that wasn’t 
the intention.  The title isn’t even mine, it’s my publisher’s. 
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Reviewed by David Fagundes, Southwestern Law School. 
dfagundes@swlaw.edu 
 
In THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS 
INNOVATION, Kal Raustiala and Chris Sprigman recount a series of 
engaging case studies from popular culture and leverage them to generate 
insights that challenge the foundational assumptions of the U.S. intellectual 
property system.  The evidence in THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY comes in 
the form of stories about fashion and football, finance and fonts.  Raustiala 
and Sprigman make two simple observations about each of these areas: they 
are all subject to no (or very low) IP protection, and they are all 
characterized by thriving innovation. 
 
These case studies, the authors observe, illustrate that copying is clearly not 
inimical to innovation, and that in many respects copying actually spurs 
more and better creative production.  If this conclusion sounds 
counterintuitive, that is because it strikes at the conceptual heart of 
America’s IP system, which has long assumed that inventors and authors 
will develop new inventions and works only if they enjoy strong legal 
protection against unauthorized copying.  Raustiala and Sprigman’s critique 
of this premise represents a major contribution to a growing body of work 
indicating that traditional assumptions about creative production require 
fundamental rethinking in the age of the internet and digital media. 
 
Before delving into its case studies, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY begins 
with a succinct introduction that outlines the book’s findings and 
summarizes its conclusions (p.3).  THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY operates 
against the background of the “monopoly theory” of innovation.  This is the 
familiar story of IP in American law that innovation will arise and persist 
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only if creators are given exclusive rights to stamp out unauthorized uses of 
their works.  Yet many industries, such as fashion, appear not only to be 
surviving despite the presence of rampant copying, but to be thriving to a 
large extent because of rampant copying.  Other industries follow this 
pattern: food, football, and stand up comedy are, like fashion, subject to low 
(or no) IP protection.  Yet they, too, are characterized by robust degrees of 
creative production.  Raustiala and Sprigman are careful to stress the nuance 
of their claim.  They concede that laws preventing copying have an essential 
role to play in our economic and cultural life.  But the notion that copying 
can spur as well as suppress innovation makes that role much more 
conflicted than the monopoly theory suggests. 
 
Raustiala and Sprigman’s first case study, “Knockoffs and Fashion 
Victims,” adapts their previous work available elsewhere (p.19).1  Even as 
fashion has gone from an exclusive province of the social elite to a popular 
obsession, it has remained a stranger to copyright protection.  This has long 
permitted legal copying of the most popular designers’ clothes, and the 
fashion industry has long attempted to counter this through pushing legal 
reforms and private anti-copying sanctions—so far, without success.  
 
The fashion establishment’s nearly century-old battle suggests that copying 
is devastating their industry.  And indeed, copying is rampant, including by 
prominent designers.  But copying appears to be sustaining, not killing, the 
fashion industry, thanks to a phenomenon Raustiala and Sprigman term the 
“piracy paradox.”  The paradox depends on the fact that people don’t really 
need to buy new clothes as often as they do for functional reasons, so 
fashion must convince them to buy new clothes to remain consistent with 
the latest styles.  This is the fashion cycle, and the faster trends rise and fall, 
the more consumer demand there will be for new clothes.  And rules 
permitting copying fuel faster fashion cycles by accelerating the rate that 
fashion diffuses from haute couture to Canal Street knockoffs.  Raustiala 
and Sprigman assemble data confirming that even as fashion piracy has 
exploded in the last decade, prices for women’s dresses have remained 
constant and even, in the case of the top 10% of the market, risen 
substantially.  (This does not, though, answer the concern raised by other 
scholars that piracy does hurt middle- and lower-tier fashion designers.2) 
 
The piracy paradox depends also on the tendency of fashion trends to 
anchor around a handful of styles every year.  Again, it’s copying that helps 
drive this phenomenon.  How do we know who the “winners” in a given 
fashion season are?  It’s the styles that get ripped off the most, since all 
those knockoffs reflect the scale of popular demand for the original.  And 
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the beneficial effects of copying also derive from the gap between the 
release of new fashions and the moment when consumers figure out which 
styles have “won” that cycle.  For while runway fashion can be copied 
instantly (and sometimes even before it’s released, thanks to pre-fashion 
week leaks), creating and distributing popular knockoffs requires some lag 
time while hit styles heat up.  This lag time allows creators of new fashions 
a brief window of effective (if not legal) exclusivity before the winning 
styles become ubiquitous and it’s time to come up with something new for 
the next season. 
 
In Chapter 2, “Cuisine, Copying, and Creativity” (p.57), Raustiala and 
Sprigman turn to copying in the world of cuisine.  Like fashion, food has 
transformed over the last hundred years from a humdrum necessity to a 
national cultural obsession.  This obsession operates at the high end, with 
fancy restaurants packing in customers and cooking reality shows raking in 
viewers, to the low end, with food trucks garnering long lines of patrons all 
over major cities.  And also as with fashion, this explosion of enthusiasm 
for cuisine has happened in the absence of meaningful IP protection for 
most aspects of the commercial food industry.  Recipes, for example, are 
uncopyrightable, though advertising slogans may be protected through 
trademark and distinctive restaurant décor through trade dress. 
 
In light (though not necessarily because) of this relative lack of IP 
protection, copying is rampant in the culinary world.  This copying operates 
at both the level of technique (such as the sous vide craze of several years 
back) and specific dishes (the once-haute, now-ubiquitous molten chocolate 
cake, now available at Arby’s).  Yet as with fashion, food is characterized 
by thriving innovation despite widespread copying.  Raustiala and 
Sprigman proffer several reasons to explain this apparent paradox.  First, 
chefs tolerate copying but require one another to adhere to a well-
understood set of social norms.  Inspiration and homage are acceptable, but 
only if due attribution is paid to the source.  If a chef fails to follow the 
norms of the food world, her peers may exclude her from that world.  
Second, even outright copying of recipes may fail to truly supplant the 
original.  A diner’s experience of a dish is affected not only by ingredients 
and cooking times, but also by the chef’s skilled execution of a recipe as 
well as the atmosphere of the restaurant.  Finally, even a perfectly copied 
dish may not garner the same popularity as the original, since many diners 
seek food prepared by the particular chef who originated it.  You may be 
able to get pork buns at many places, but there is only one place to get pork 
buns made famous by David Chang—at one of his New York Momofuku 
restaurants. 
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The authors conclude their case study on copying and cuisine by signaling 
two general themes that pervade the rest of the book.  First, the cuisine 
world operates pursuant to an open-source ethic.  So long as chefs follow 
the relevant social norms, they are willing to share their innovations with 
one another, and they encourage rather than discourage copying.  This ethic 
may be starkly opposed to the monopoly theory of innovation, but the 
richness of innovation in the cuisine world suggests that open-source may 
be a superior way to achieve creative production.  Second, the actual food 
that ends up on your plate reflects only a fraction of what you are getting 
when you go to a fancy restaurant.  You’re really getting an experience—
attentive service, flossy décor, the company of other fine diners, and 
proximity to a celebrity chef.  In this respect, modern cuisine is as much a 
performance as a product.  And since performances, in cuisine or other 
fields, must be seen in person to be truly experienced, they are virtually 
impossible to copy. 
 
From food, Raustiala and Sprigman turn to the world of stand-up comedy.  
This chapter, “Comedy Vigilantes” (p.97), also adapts work that appears 
elsewhere.3   Comedy has transformed itself over the second half of the 
twentieth century.  Where comedians used to just recite snappy, generic 
one-liners, their sets now consist of individualized, and often deeply 
personal, comic monologues.  Yet comedy too is almost entirely 
unprotected by IP, since the idea of a joke (as opposed to the particular 
expression of it) enjoys no copyright protection.  
 
In comedy, too, there is substantial creativity despite the lack of IP 
protection.  Unlike in fashion and food, however, the reason is not that the 
comedy world is characterized by frequent copying that spurs more 
innovation.  Rather, comedians have developed and enforce social norms 
that preclude copying.  These norms sweep more broadly than copyright 
law.  Any comic who initially comes up with a premise for a joke, owns it.  
And this includes the idea of the joke, not just the particular expression of it. 
 
Because comedians do not rely on law to protect their jokes, though, they 
have to enforce their informal rules themselves.  And they do.  When a 
dispute over joke stealing begins, the custom is to start by simply discussing 
the concern and asking the purported copier to stop.  When that fails, 
though, aggrieved comedians may pressure peers and venues to refuse to 
deal with the copier.  Robin Williams, for example, found himself 
ostracized from popular Los Angeles comedy venue The Comedy Store 
because of allegations of joke stealing.  Comedians may also enforce norms 
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by attacking the reputation of the copier.  Louis C.K.’s repeated complaints 
that Dane Cook stole his jokes hurt Cook’s credibility in the comedy world 
so much that Cook appeared on Louis C.K.’s television show to (quasi-
fictionally) address the issue.  Or aggrieved comedians may just attack the 
copier, as Joe Rogan famously did when he instigated an on-stage 
confrontation with Carlos Mencia at The Comedy Store.  
 
The authors conclude this chapter by asking why comedy innovation thrives 
due to social norms preventing copying, while creativity in fashion and food 
because of the ubiquity of copying.  First, the comedy world is small and 
close-knit enough that social norms can be both widely understood and 
enforced by shaming and shunning sanctions.  Second, comedians feel 
compelled to create social norms rather than using IP law because the 
subject matter they seek to protect—the idea of jokes—lies on the 
unprotected side of copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy.  Finally, strong 
norm-based protection of jokes matches the detailed, highly personal nature 
of current comedy routines.  When comedy was just about repeating generic 
one-liners, copying was rampant.  But now that comedians invest much 
more time in their routines, and where those routines are so much more 
personal, the community has stronger incentives to protect the exclusivity of 
jokes. 
 
Raustiala and Sprigman’s final case study, “Football, Fonts, Finance, and 
Feist” (p.123), examines four different areas in which innovation thrives in 
the presence of frequent copying.  Start with football.  The sport is regularly 
transformed by major innovations like the West Coast offense, the zone 
blitz, or the spread offense.  That these innovations persist despite a culture 
that freely permits other coaches to copy them is explicable largely by first-
mover advantage.  A coach who comes up with a great new innovation gets 
to enjoy the competitive edge it brings while other coaches struggle to catch 
up and use it themselves (often “tweaking” it to make marginal 
improvements that further develop its efficacy).  And the innovating coach 
garners fame and career advancement as a result of being recognized as the 
creator of a revolutionary strategy. 
 
Consider, by contrast, fonts.  IP law, for formal and practical reasons, does 
not protect typefaces.  Yet the number of available fonts has exploded in 
recent years, approaching 170,000 by some estimates, most of which are 
substantially based on preexisting fonts.  Here, technology solves the 
paradox of massive innovation in the face of widespread copying.  Making 
typefaces has become much easier in the age of digital technology, with 
much of the innovation coming from amateur rather than professional 
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designers.  Moreover, as printing technology changes at an accelerating 
pace, so does demand for font innovation, regardless of whether those fonts 
enjoy IP protection.  Moreover, companies like Adobe want to be able to 
boast that their software comes with attractive bells and whistles—such as a 
profusion of typefaces.  And since typefaces are typically ancillary to other 
products, they may bring more value when widely sharable and freely 
available than when held under proprietary lockdown. 
 
The world of finance, too, is highly innovative—perhaps too much so, 
considering that the Great Recession of 2008 was brought on to a large 
extent by novel investment vehicles.  And while courts have held business 
methods to be patentable, most financial firms do not seek patents for their 
innovations.  The reason appears to be that firms just don’t need IP, since 
those that develop major innovations typically retain a dominant market 
share for years regardless of how much they are copied.  This powerful 
first-mover advantage may derive from the reputation and in-house 
expertise associated with firms that create financial innovations.  Or it may 
simply be due to the fact that most firms that develop groundbreaking 
investment strategies are large, well-established entities with substantial 
market power and entrenched client lists. 
 
Finally, the authors turn to the database industry.  Since the Supreme 
Court’s 1991 decision in Feist v. Rural Publications, 4  databases have 
received only very thin copyright protection in the United States.  Their 
selection and arrangement of facts may be protectable, but the facts 
themselves are free to be copied.  This contrasts sharply with the European 
Union, which (right around the time Feist was decided in the U.S.) passed a 
law granting a fifteen-year period of exclusive rights to databases.  The 
monopoly theory of innovation would predict that this would have meant an 
explosion in database productivity in Europe and a concomitant 
diminishment stateside.  But in what may be the most surprising reported 
finding of THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY, just the opposite turned out to 
be true.  European database production had flatlined or slightly declined in 
the decade-plus following the copy-preclusive EU law, while database 
production in the U.S. had swelled to a 70% share of the global marketplace.  
The reasons for this paradox are several, but most instructive among them is 
that the freedom of database copying in the U.S. has led rival producers to 
compete not in terms of gathering data, but in terms of thinking of new and 
creative ways to present that data.  Some individual European firms are 
better off thanks to EU database law, but the overall European database 
industry has grown weaker. 
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Raustiala and Sprigman’s “Conclusion: Copies and Creativity” (p.167) is 
actually the book’s penultimate chapter.  The authors first summarize the 
major themes that emerged from their case studies of creative industries 
with no (or low) IP.  These include the dynamics spawned by trends and 
fads; the constraining influence of social norms; the ability to render 
copying less relevant by translating products into performance; the power of 
open-source methods to lower the costs of innovation; the market 
dominance that first-mover advantage brings even in the absence of IP 
protection; and the capacity of copies to serve as advertisements for brands. 
 
These factors complicate the simplistic premise of the monopoly theory of 
innovation that copying always crushes creative production.  But what does 
this mean for the future of innovation?  The authors rightly stress that what 
matters for making this prediction is not merely restrictions on copying, but 
the return on innovation.  Two factors warrant optimism that future returns 
will be positive.  One is optimism bias.  Creators systematically 
overestimate the success their products will achieve, as studies have 
repeatedly shown.  And the advent of digital media has caused the costs of 
creation to drop precipitously in many fields.  The combination of creators’ 
overconfidence with ease of production suggests a future rich in creative 
production for many fields, even in the absence of strong IP rights. 
 
The authors conclude their tour through innovation in low-IP creative 
industries with “Epilogue:  The Future of Music” (p.213), which considers 
the book’s implications for creative industries that are subject to full IP 
rights.  This chapter begins with the important distinction between the 
music industry (typically referring to just the major record labels) and music 
itself.  The popular notion that the music industry is dying is not far wrong 
(record company revenues declined almost 50% from 1999-2009), but 
music itself is thriving in terms of diversity and quality, availability and 
quantity.  The music industry’s decline may have been a self-inflicted 
wound due as much to pride as to illegal filesharing.  The record labels’ 
insistence on crushing rather than partnering with Napster only opened the 
door for Apple’s iTunes to grab a stranglehold on the online music-purchase 
market. 
 
How can other creative industries, such as Hollywood, avoid the fate of the 
record labels?  There are glimmers of hope even from within the wreckage 
of the music industry.  Music, like food, can be repackaged as an experience 
good, and going to a live performance is something that can’t be copied.  
Bands now often earn more from touring than from record sales.  Music has 
also succeeded when it has been linked with social networking, which 
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allows artists to rocket from obscurity to commercial success by building 
fan bases via Twitter and Facebook and distributing their albums directly 
via their websites.  And diversification of media (vinyl, for example, retains 
intrinsic appeal even in the age of MP3s) and markets (streaming options 
like Spotify) may allow enough choice to keep consumers coming back. 
 
THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY’s readable style and fun subject matter 
make it suitable for a general audience, as well as well-versed IP experts.  It 
is at once a modest and ambitious project.  Its modesty lies in the 
constrained nature of its thesis.  Raustiala and Sprigman do not argue that 
copying is an unalloyed good, or that all IP should be abolished.  Rather, 
they claim merely that copying is not necessarily harmful to creative 
production and can even—contrary to what the monopoly theory of 
innovation suggests—spur innovation.  That creativity and copying may 
coexist does not, of course, tell us whether low-IP worlds such as fashion, 
food, or fonts are achieving the optimal level of creative production.  Chefs 
and clothes designers may do better in a world of strong IP rights.  But 
Raustiala and Sprigman make a compelling predictive case that this is not, 
at least in the industries they have studied, at all likely.  And this 
counterfactual uncertainty does not diminish the ambition of their thesis, 
which undermines the core presumption of the monopoly theory of 
innovation that copying is inimical to creative production.  
 
Of the many promising directions for future work embedded within THE 
KNOCKOFF ECONOMY, one puzzle in particular stands out:  if the 
authors are right that copying can be a boon to both owners and their works, 
why do so many creators react angrily to unauthorized use?  Are they 
merely unaware of copying’s upside, or does their resistance signal an 
instinctive aversion to unauthorized use that complicates this story even 
further?  It is a measure of the richness of Raustiala and Sprigman’s work 
that this is only one of countless intriguing questions raised by this 
provocative and eminently readable book. 
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It is perhaps characteristic of the internet generation that it does not ask 
what it cannot do; if it asks at all, it asks what it can do.  This behavior 
translates into an increased interest in the scope of the public domain – all 
the results of intellectual activity that are free for anyone to use without a 
license or permission.  The internet has increased the public’s interest in the 
public domain because the internet has made so many of us not only 
frequent users but also regular creators of publicly accessible works that 
often build on the creations of others.  But the internet has certainly not 
been the only impetus for the increased interest in the public domain; the 
emphasis on the knowledge economy and the fact that many developed 
countries rely on the creations resulting from their intellectual capital as the 
major, or at least one of the major, outputs of their economies leads these 
countries to focus on the protection of intellectual property and the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.  The more that these countries 
concentrate on protection and enforcement, the more acutely the public is 
interested in defending the scope of the public domain. 
 
Alexander Peukert, a professor of civil and commercial law who specializes 
in international intellectual property law at Goethe University in Frankfurt 
am Main, Germany, has responded to the general interest in the public 
domain and devoted his latest book to the goal of defining its limits.  As 
opposed to the situation in the United States, where the contours of the 
public domain have been discussed and where, as Professor Peukert has 
observed, the discussion has become somewhat of a fashion wave (p.18), in 
Germany the problem of delineating the public domain has not received 
much attention (p.16).  In addition to filling the gap in the German 
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intellectual property literature, Professor Peukert works to alleviate the 
global lack of contextual discussion about the future shape of the public 
domain because, as he says, if one continues to look at particular legal 
issues and the future of the public domain from outside of the context of 
particular issues, the discussion “remains sterile and without consequences” 
(p.18). 
 
The title of the book might surprise some German-speaking readers; 
although “Gemeingut” is the term that is typically used to translate the 
English term “public domain,”1 Peukert chose the title “Die 
Gemeinfreiheit” for his book.  The term “Gemeinfreiheit” is becoming more 
frequent than “Gemeingut” in current German legal practice, including in 
the decisions of German courts.2  Peukert guides the reader through a useful 
review of the etymology of the two terms and the history of the 
terminological competition between them (pp. 8-18), and explains his 
preference for the term “Gemeinfreiheit.”  While “Gemeingut” refers to the 
classification of a public domain work, “Gemeinfreiheit” emphasizes the 
relationship between the user and the public domain work—the user’s 
ability to freely enjoy that public domain work. 
 
Defining the public domain is not a simple task; commentators typically use 
a negative definition that describes the public domain as everything that is 
not protected by intellectual property (see Figure 1).3  Peukert points out 
that international intellectual property law supports this prevailing practice 
of delineating the public domain with a negative definition because 
international law provides for minimum standards for protection of 
intellectual property rights and for exceptions to the rights, thereby ignoring 
the fact that being in the public domain should result from the default rule 
and that protecting a work with intellectual property rights should be 
understood as an exception to the default rule (pp.75-76). 
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One difficulty with the common negative definition of the public domain 
that Peukert does not discuss is that it only depicts rights with their positive 
“footprint”―rights that right owners can transfer, license, etc.  The negative 
definition ignores the fact that intellectual property rights produce a larger 
footprint for a work than simply that which is contained in the copyrighted 
work itself or in the text of a patent.  In infringement actions, doctrines such 
as the doctrine of equivalents in patent law or the substantial similarity 
doctrine in copyright law enlarge, de facto, the scope of the protected right 
beyond the letter of the patent or the image or sound of the copyrighted 
work.  Therefore, a negative definition of the public domain would be better 
expressed as shown in Figure 2, where the footprint of the intellectual 
property is enlarged by the effect of the doctrines and the edges of 
intellectual property are blurry—thus reflecting the impact of the doctrines, 
which neither result in consistent decisions, nor offer a particularly high 
degree of predictability. 
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Peukert strives to present a positive definition of the public domain; his 
approach aligns his work with other authors who have suggested that the 
public domain should be viewed from the perspective of the rights of users 
who seek to utilize the intellectual creations of others.4  Peukert’s analysis 
leads him to identify four dimensions of the public domain:  a “structural 
dimension,” a “time-determined dimension,” a “consensual dimension,” and 
a “specific dimension.”  The structural dimension (pp.19 ff.) consists of 
intellectual goods that have never been subject to intellectual property, such 
as basic knowledge and small improvements.  The time-determined 
dimension (pp.28 ff.) covers works that were once protected as intellectual 
property but whose term of protection has expired.  The consensual 
dimension (pp.30 ff.) includes works that are protected as intellectual 
property, but the owner of the property decided to forfeit, or not to enforce 
the right.  While this dimension is somewhat more clearly defined in the 
case of registered works (where a decision to forfeit the right might 
translate into a non-registration), the contours of the domain are more blurry 
in cases of non-registered rights, such as copyright, where replacements for 
registration, such as the system of Creative Commons licenses, strive to 
bring more certainty to the dimension.  Finally, the specific dimension of 
the public domain (pp.32 ff.) is defined as a set of legally defined 
exceptions that allow the use of the works by a specific user in a specific 
manner. 
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Through his analysis of the four dimensions of the public domain Peukert 
offers a much richer picture of the contours of the public domain than does 
the negative definition.  Peukert’s model is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
While Peukert’s definition as illustrated in Figure 3 provides a much more 
accurate picture of the public domain (the white area) than the commonly-
used negative definition depicted in Figure 1, to capture the full complexity 
of the picture of the public domain, Peukert’s definition should be 
completed with the blurry edges of intellectual property―the extended 
scope of intellectual property rights protection pictured with blurry edges in 
Figure 2. 
 
In practice, the complex public domain can maintain its shape only if it is 
properly safeguarded.  Peukert reviews the various means of safeguarding 
the public domain and emphasizes the “careful attention to the limits of 
exclusive rights” (p.129) that courts need to pay to protect the public 
domain from unlawful extensions of intellectual property rights.  
Procedurally, the public domain is protected through the registration 
obligations imposed on some types of intellectual property; additionally, 
proceedings for a declaration of invalidity can help to correct registrations 
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that should not have been granted (pp.130 ff.).  Attacks on validity in 
infringement proceedings can also help to clarify the contours of the public 
domain.  Substantive law should protect the public domain from unlawful 
claims of exclusive rights and permit a right owner to forfeit his rights if he 
so chooses (pp.201 ff.).  In a non-contractual context the public domain 
needs to be protected when unlawful cease and desist letters are used to 
claim nonexistent rights, or when technological protection measures are 
used to protect works beyond the boundaries of intellectual property rights. 
 
Peukert not only describes the history and current state of the public 
domain, he also looks to the future and offers several proposals for changes 
in German and EU law.  For example, after reviewing the proposal for the 
EU patent litigation system, he suggests that Germany consider abandoning 
its bifurcated system—in which different bodies decide on patent 
infringements and validity—and adopt a model similar to the proposed EU 
patent litigation system by creating a special federal court to adjudicate 
patent infringements and validity issues in one forum (p.168).  Peukert’s 
most intriguing proposal is for the creation of the positions of public 
domain protection officers—at both the EU and national levels. 
 
Peukert proposes that a public domain protection officer be established to 
solve the enforcement deficit that he perceives in the current environment 
(p.276).  He emphasizes that actions for enforcement of the public domain 
should not rely solely on the actions of individuals, who will act only when 
they have “significant commercial or other interests,” or actions by 
consumer protection organizations and business organizations (p.275).  The 
public domain officer would be an independent governmental officer whose 
position would be similar to the position of data protection officers in the 
EU and in the EU member states.5  In Germany, establishing the position 
would be easier because of the previously existing function that is fulfilled 
by the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of 
Information, who is in charge of assisting with requests based on the 
freedom of official information act (p.277), as well as matters related to data 
protection. 
 
Peukert outlines an agenda for the public domain officer, summarizes the 
budgetary requirements for running the office, and explains that the 
resources allocated for the position would pay off in increased freedom of 
movement of knowledge and innovation (p.279).  His proposed agenda does 
not include any activities addressing potential future individual acts of 
limiting the public domain, which differs from the agenda of the data 
protection officers in the European Union, where the officers have been 
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responsible for the examination of data processing prior to the 
commencement of the processing―a responsibility that has been an 
important component of the officers’ agenda and a role that has helped 
define the EU’s approach to personal data collection and processing.6  
However, it is not surprising that Peukert does not include such prospective 
activities in the public domain officer’s agenda because it is difficult to 
imagine that a similar prospectively-directed agenda concerning individual 
acts could exist to safeguard the public domain.  As for the budgetary 
considerations, they would have to be accompanied by a full impact 
assessment that would need to clarify what greater level of freedom would 
be achieved if the independent officer were to take actions to supplement 
private actions by individuals with “significant commercial or other 
interests”; the question would be whether safeguarding the public domain 
outside of the “significant commercial or other interests” of individuals 
would warrant the expenditure of state funds. 
 
Although Peukert’s proposals are directed at German and EU law, Peukert 
also offers a valuable comparative perspective on the public domain that 
reaches beyond EU borders.  The comparative perspective is an important 
feature of the analysis; even though Peukert’s positive definition describes 
the four dimensions of the public domain generally as they exist in every 
country, the particular contours of the public domain vary logically country 
by country (p.18).  In addition to sharing his extensive expertise in German 
and EU law, Peukert draws on his thorough knowledge of U.S. and other 
non-European literature and case law to explain the perception of the public 
domain in the works of numerous commentators, analyze differences in 
national contours of the public domain, and discuss various means of 
enforcement of the public domain.  A reader unfamiliar with German law 
will learn about the German system from the book.  A reader with limited 
knowledge of German intellectual property law will expand his knowledge 
and appreciate, for example, Peukert’s detailed discussion of Germany’s 
bifurcated proceedings in patent matters (in which issues of validity and 
infringement are decided not by a single institution or court but by separate 
institutions and courts) (p.166 ff.), and Peukert’s explanation of the monist 
system in copyright law, which does not allow a copyright owner to transfer 
or forfeit his copyright, thus creating a particular difficulty in the 
consensual dimension of the public domain (pp.205-211). 
 
Peukert refers to current developments in intellectual property law, such as 
the extension in the European Union of the term of protection from 50 to 70 
years for rights of performers and producers of phonograms, which EU 
member states must implement by November 1, 2013,7 and the proposal for 
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an EU patent and an EU patent litigation system (p.167).  With an up-to-
date picture of the trajectory of intellectual property protection and the 
public domain, Peukert offers an important snapshot of a moment in the 
global history of intellectual property law and development of the public 
domain.  In addition to being a current review, the book is timeless because 
of its conceptual approach to the problem of defining the public domain. 
 
Professor Peukert introduces a system for thinking about the public domain 
and promotes an understanding of its functions and the importance of 
various means to safeguard the public domain.  While Peukert offers a 
positive rather than negative definition of the public domain, he maintains 
its reference to intellectual property and does not attempt to encompass the 
larger area of “commons” (pp.46 ff.).8  Peukert’s definition does not align 
with Professor Samuelson’s notion of the continuum of various legal states 
(which starts with intellectual property rights on one end and finishes with 
the “constitutional public domain” on the other end),9 but rather emphasizes 
the multidimensional character of the public domain, which does not lend 
itself to a linear gradation from the most to the least restrictive legal states.  
Some of Peukert’s proposals might be controversial, such as creating the 
position of public domain officer; however, his proposals are useful impeti, 
in any case, for considering positive steps that could be taken to create a 
counterbalance to the actions of supporters of stronger protection for 
intellectual property. 
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